5. Remuneration architecture
5.1 Board of Directors
The remuneration of the members of the Board of Directors is defined in a regulation adopted by the Board of Directors and consists of an annual fixed retainer and remuneration for committee work. The remuneration is paid in the form of shares subject to a four-year blocking period. In addition, the members of the Board of Directors receive a lump sum to cover their expenses, paid out in cash.
The Chairman of the Board of Directors receives an annual total fixed retainer paid 70% in cash and 30% in restricted shares subject to a four-year blocking period. The Chairman also receives the expense allowance but is not entitled to additional fees for committee attendance.
The structure and amount of the remuneration for the members of the Board of Directors were reviewed by an independent consulting company in 2019. The analysis indicated that the remuneration system for the Board of Directors of Geberit is in line with customary market practices and that therefore no modifications to the structure and amount of remuneration for the Board of Directors were necessary:
|Annual fees||in CHF||Delivery|
|Chairman||885,000||Cash and restricted shares|
|Vice Chairman||245,000||Restricted shares|
|Member of the BoD||190,000||Restricted shares|
|Chairman of NCC / Audit Committee||45,000||Restricted shares|
|Member of NCC / Audit Committee||30,000||Restricted shares|
The remuneration is paid out at the end of the term of office and is subject to contributions to social security. The members of the Board of Directors are not covered under the company pension plan.
The shares are subject to an accelerated unblocking in case of death: they remain subject to the regular blocking period in all other instances.
Further information regarding the remuneration amounts for the period from the 2021 Annual General Meeting to the 2022 Annual General Meeting is provided in the invitation to the 2021 Annual General Meeting.
5.2 Group Executive Board
The remuneration of the Group Executive Board is defined in a regulation adopted by the Board of Directors and consists of the following elements:
- Base salary
- Variable cash remuneration (Short-Term Incentive/STI)
- Long-term equity participation plan (Long-Term Incentive/LTI)
- Additional employee benefits, such as pension benefits and perquisites
metrics in 2020
|Base salary||Annual base
|Monthly cash payments||Pay for the function|
|Short-Term Incentive, STI||Short-Term Incentive, STI||Annual variable cash||Drive and reward performance, attract and retain||1-year performance period||Sales, EBITDA margin, EPS, ROIC, individual objectives|
|Matching share options in case of an investment of variable cash in restricted shares, cost-free performance share options||Align with shareholders’
3-year restriction period
|Long-Term Incentive, LTI||Share Option Plan
|Performance share options||Drive and reward long-term performance, align with shareholders’ interests, retain||3-year performance period, 9-year plan period||ROIC|
|Benefits||Pension||Swiss pension funds
under Art. 1e BVV 2)
|Cover retirement, death and disability risks|
|Perquisites||Company car, expense policy||Attract and
The base salary is a fixed remuneration paid in cash on a monthly basis. It is determined on the basis of the scope and responsibilities of the position, the market value of the role and the qualifications and experience of the incumbent. The base salary is reviewed annually based on market salary information, considerations from the perspective of the company’s financial affordability and performance, and the evolving experience of the individual in the role.
Variable cash remuneration / Short-Term Incentive (STI)
The variable cash remuneration (STI) of the Group Executive Board and approximately 200 additional members of Group management rewards the achievement of annual financial business goals and of individual objectives agreed and evaluated within the annual performance management process.
The base salary and the STI (assuming 100% achievement of all financial business goals) form the so-called target income. The variable target remuneration (i.e. the STI assuming 100% achievement of all objectives) is unchanged over the previous year. In accordance with standard market practice it is now expressed as a percentage of the annual base salary and equals 43% for the CEO and the other members of the Group Executive Board.
Group financial business goals
Individual performance component
The financial objectives include equal weightings of sales performance and earnings per share (EPS) compared with the previous year as well as the margin on earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA margin) and the return on invested capital (ROIC). These financial objectives have been chosen because they are key value drivers for Geberit and generally reward for growing the business and gaining market share (top-line contribution), for increasing profitability over-proportionally through strong operating leverage (bottom-line contribution) and for investing the capital efficiently. Every year, on the basis of a recommendation made by the NCC, the Board of Directors determines the expected target level of performance for each financial objective for the following year. Geberit wants to reinforce its position as market leader and consistently achieve above-average performance. As a general principle, the results achieved in the previous year must be specifically improved in order to meet the target level of performance, in line with the company’s ambitious financial plan. The intention of this demanding target setting is to deliver best-in-class performance and to stay ahead of the market. In addition, a threshold level of performance, below which no variable remuneration is paid out, and a maximum level of performance, above which the short-term variable remuneration is capped, are determined. The payout level between the threshold, the target and the maximum is calculated by linear interpolation.
The individual performance component is based on the achievement of individual objectives predefined at the beginning of the year between the CEO and individual members of the Group Executive Board, and for the CEO, between the Board of Directors and the CEO. The individual objectives are of a more qualitative and strategic nature and may include, for example, objectives related to product and service innovation, leadership skills, entry in new markets, management of strategic projects and leadership.
The maximum payout for achievement of all objectives is 200% of the variable target remuneration, equivalent to 100% of the base salary.
Members of the Group Executive Board have the opportunity to invest part or all of their variable cash remuneration in shares of the company through the Management Stock Purchase Plan (MSPP). They may define a fixed number of shares to purchase, or a certain amount or a percentage of their variable cash remuneration to be invested in shares. The shares are blocked for a period of three years. In order to encourage executives to participate in the programme, 1.5 free share options are provided for each share purchased through the programme. The options are subject to a performance-based vesting period of three years. The other features of the options and the performance condition (ROIC) are the same as those applicable to the options granted under the Long-Term Incentive MSOP programme (see also Long-Term Incentive, LTI).
In the event of termination of employment, the following provisions apply to MSPP shares and options:
|Termination reason||Plan rules|
|Unvested options||Vested options||Restricted shares|
|Good leaver||Retirement benefits||Immediate|
|Invalidity||Full exercise based on effective performance at regular vesting date||unblocking|
|Other reasons||Regular||Regular blocking period|
|Liquidation/change of control*||Accelerated full vesting based on effective performance at date of termination as determined by the Board of Directors||exercise period||Immediate unblocking|
|Death||Accelerated full vesting|
|Bad leaver||Inadequate performance/inadequate conduct**||Forfeiture||Regular exercise period||Regular blocking period|
Long-Term Incentive (LTI)
The purpose of the Long-Term Incentive (Management Stock Option Plan MSOP) is to ensure long-term value creation for the company, alignment of the interests of executives to those of shareholders and long-term retention of executives.
The vesting of share options is subject to the achievement of a performance criterion, the average Return on Invested Capital (ROIC), over the respective vesting period. ROIC expresses how well the company is generating cash relative to the capital it has invested in its business. The Board of Directors determines the expected performance annually on the basis of a recommendation submitted by the Nomination and Compensation Committee. The options partially vest upon the reference level being achieved. In addition, a minimum level of performance (threshold value) under which no options vest and a maximum level of performance (cap) at which 100% of the options vest are defined. Both the reference level and the cap are ambitious and are substantially above the weighted average cost of capital. The payout amounts between the threshold value and the cap are determined by linear interpolation. The options can be exercised between the respective vesting date, three years after being granted, and the expiration date. The exercise price of the options corresponds to the fair market value of the underlying share at the time of granting.
MSOP payout curve
Every year, the Board of Directors determines the granting of share options. There was no change in the granting of the LTI over the previous year in 2020. The fair value of options granted amounted to 86% of the annual base salary for the CEO and 71% of the annual base salary for the other members of the Group Executive Board. For some 100 additional participants of the Group management, the fair value amounted to 13% of the base salary.
In the event of termination of employment, the following provisions apply to MSOP options:
|Termination reason||Plan rules|
|Unvested options||Vested options|
|Good leaver||Retirement benefits
||Pro-rata exercise based on effective performance at regular vesting date|
|Liquidation/change of control*||Accelerated full vesting based on effective performance at date of termination as determined by the Board of Directors||exercise period|
|Death||Accelerated full vesting|
|Bad leaver||Inadequate performance/inadequate conduct**||Forfeiture||Regular exercise period|
Disclosure of targets
Internal financial and individual targets under the STI and the LTI plans are considered commercially sensitive information. Communicating such targets would allow delicate insight into the strategy of Geberit and could as such create a competitive disadvantage for the company. Therefore, the decision was made not to disclose the specifics of those targets at the time of their setting, but to provide a general comment on the performance at the end of the cycle. As a general principle, on a comparable basis, significant improvements against the previous year’s achievements are required in order to meet the target level of performance, in line with the company’s ambitious financial plan.
Members of the Group Executive Board participate in the regular employee pension fund applicable to all employees in Switzerland. The retirement plan consists of a basic plan covering annual earnings up to TCHF 149 per annum, with age-related contribution rates equally shared between the company and the individual, and a supplementary plan in which income in excess of TCHF 149 is insured (including actual variable cash remuneration), up to the maximum amount permitted by law. The NCC reviewed and revised the supplementary benefits in 2020. The Wohlfahrtsfonds was replaced by a collective foundation (Sammelstiftung) in accordance with Art. 1e BVV 2 (Ordinance on Occupational Retirement, Surviving Dependants’ and Disability Pension Plans) effective 1 January 2020. This did not have any effect on the company’s income statement. With respect to these supplementary benefits, the plan participants are able to individually select the investment strategy and deposit higher savings of their own.
Furthermore, each member of the Group Executive Board is entitled to a company car and a representation allowance in line with the expense regulations applicable to all members of management in Switzerland and approved by the tax authorities.
Employment terms and conditions
All members of the Group Executive Board have permanent employment contracts with notice periods of a maximum of one year. Members of the Group Executive Board are not entitled to any severance payment.
In order to bring the interests of the members of the Group Executive Board into line with those of the shareholders and to strengthen their ties to the company, the CEO and each member of the Group Executive Board must satisfy the minimum requirements with respect to the ownership of shares in Geberit.
In order to ensure good Corporate Governance, Geberit has implemented a clawback policy on payments made under the Short-Term Incentive programme and the Long-Term Incentive programme. Those provisions foresee that in case of financial restatement due to non-compliance with accounting standards and/or fraud, and/or in case of violation of the law or internal rules by a participant, the Board of Directors may deem all or part of any unpaid short-term incentive or unvested long-term incentive to be forfeited (malus provision) and/or may seek reimbursement of all or part of any paid short-term incentive or vested long-term incentive. The clawback and malus provisions may be enacted for a period of three years following the year subject to a financial restatement and/or the year of the fraudulent behaviour.
For further information on both programmes, please also refer to 5. Remuneration architecture, 5.2 Group Executive Board.